

John Wesley's Anthropology in the Light of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument

Dae Kyung Jun

(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Visiting Professor,
Scientific Philosophy)

- I. Introduction: Considering the Engagement
- II. John Wesley's Monism: Reductive Physicalism or Epiphenomenalism
- III. John Wesley's Dualism: Non-reductive Physicalism or Emergentism
- IV. John Wesley's Christian Anthropology as Trialism: Substance or Property
- V. Conclusion: Breaking off the Engagement

[Abstract]

Was John Wesley a substance dualist, or a monist? In regard to this mind-body problem, it seems there have not been yet any distinguished, so-called, “received view” in Wesleyan theology. For instance, one of renowned wesleyan theologians, William Ragsdale Cannon seems to depict Wesley as a substance dualist, while another well-known wesleyan theologian, Young-tae Han seems to claim Wesley as a substance monist. Are they both wrong, or either of them is right? There is no way that both correct, logically. If John Wesley was a trialist, who stands for soul, spirit, and body, then none of Han and Cannon is correct. What is the reality of John Wesley’s anthropology in regard to the mind-body problem? That is the research question underlies at the bottom of this paper.

In search for the answer to the question above, this article deals with John Wesley’s Anthropology in the light of Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument, which is also known as exclusion argument. Kim’s well known reductive physicalism, along with criticisms against him, would give us a vantage point for reifying and re-envisioning of Wesley’s view on mind-body problem. To focus on and narrow down the research topic to the mind-body problem, this article intentionally exclude other theological sub-themes, which are not directly related to the main topic of this paper, in anthropology.

This article is to clarify the reality of Wesley’s view on mind-body problem. First, if Wesley, as a monist, is a reductive physicalist or an epiphenomenalist is dealt. Secondly, if Wesley is a property dualist(or a non-reductive physicalist) or a substance dualist is dealt. Lastly, the reality of Wesley’s view on mind-body, if he is

a trailist, is comprehensively examined. It is to argue that John Wesley's Christian anthropology is, if "the intermediate state" is considered, neither dualism nor monism.

Key Words: Monism, Dualism, Trialism, Reductive Physicalism, Supervenience, Causal Power

논문투고일 2022.06.26. / 심사완료일 2022.08.30. / 게재확정일 2022.09.07.

I. Introduction: Considering the Engagement

Was John Wesley(1703-1791) a substance dualist, or a monist? In regard to this mind-body problem, it seems there have not been yet any distinguished, so-called, “received view” in Wesleyan theology. For instance, one of renowned wesleyan theologians, William Ragsdale Cannon(1916-1997) seems to depict Wesley as a substance dualist, while another well-known wesleyan theologian, Young-tae Han(1948-) seems to claim Wesley as a substance monist. Are they both wrong, or either of them is right? There is no way that both correct, logically. If John Wesley was a trialist, which stands for soul, spirit, and body, then none of Han and Cannon is correct. What is the reality of John Wesley’s anthropology in regard to the mind-body problem? That is the research question that underlies at the bottom of this paper.

In search for the answer to the question above, this article deals with John Wesley’s Anthropology in the light of Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument, which is also known as exclusion argument. Kim’s well known reductive physicalism, along with criticisms against him, would give us a vantage point for reifying and re-envisioning of Wesley’s view on mind-body problem. To focus on and narrow down the research topic to the mind-body problem, this article intentionally exclude other theological sub-themes, which are not directly related to the main topic of this paper, in anthropology. This article is to clarify the reality of Wesley’s view on mind-body problem. First, if Wesley, as a monist, is a reductive physicalist or an epiphenomenalist is dealt. Secondly, if Wesley is a property dualist(or a non-reductive physicalist) or a substance dualist is dealt.

Lastly, the reality of Wesley's view on mind-body, if he is a trailist, is comprehensively examined. It is to argue that John Wesley's Christian anthropology is, if "the intermediate state" is considered, neither dualism nor monism.

II. John Wesley's Monism: Reductive Physicalism or Epiphenomenalism

1. Categories of Monism in Philosophy of Mind

There are only two options for a monist could take for mind-body problem in the perspective of contemporary philosophy of mind, which is in the tradition of analytic philosophy: reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. In short, reductive physicalism argues that mental properties do not have any causal power and all mental causations are reduced to their physical grounds while non-reductive physicalism insists that most, if not all, mental properties are not reduced to physical properties.

Although there are epiphenomenalism¹ and emergentism² that could be considered, while not ignored, under the broad senses of reductive and non-reductive physicalisms. Of course, Jaegwon Kim would not agree with his reductive physicalism is being regarded in the same category with epiphenomenalism, from which he has

¹ As it literally says, epiphenomenalism is the view that mind is mere epiphenomenal resultant of physical activities in human brain.

² Simply put, emergentism is the belief, in a broad sense, that there exist emergent properties, such as mental properties, which can neither be expected from their base physical properties nor be governed by the physical laws.

tried to distinguish himself. Yet, in consideration of causal power, reductive physicalism and epiphenomenalism are on the same side since they argue that mind(or any mental property) does not have any causal power in the physical world. Although Kim tries to escape from epiphenomenalism by saying that ‘mind - mental properties - does not have causal power, but has causal efficacy,’³ it seems nonsense, to me, what that means exactly. How could a mind have a causal efficacy if it does not have any causal power? The burden of explanation is totally on Kim. But he does not explain the profound differences of those two in detail in his work.⁴ Kim must have distinguished ‘the causal power’ and ‘causal efficacy’ of mental properties to avoid both from epiphenomenalism and Ned Block’s “generalization argument,”⁵ which accuse Kim’s exclusion argument makes all causalities drained all the way down to the bottom level of particle physics, if Kim’s reductive supervenience argument is generalized, and that none of special sciences could have causal explanation at all.


The main point of Kim’s reductive physicalism is exclusion argument, in a narrow sense, which is also called supervenience argument, in a broad sense. You would know what they say “a picture is worth a thousand words.” Kim’s the most favorite and famous diagram below - of course the diagram is adjusted by the writer though - would be more beneficial than my 1-full page of explanation

3 Jaegwon Kim, “Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 97 (1997), 287.

4 See, Jaegwon Kim, *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) & Jaegwon Kim, *Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998).

5 Ned Block, “Do Causal Powers Drain Away?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67 (2003), 133-150.

with words for readers to understand Kim's main point and his opponents' non-reductive physicalists arguments.



It is a common sense that a property can not be a causation to another property. So, technically, M, P, M*, or P* should be read as an instantiation of its property. For instance, if it is sad that “P causes P*,” that means an instantiation of physical property 1 causes an instantiation of physical property 2 as an effect. In this article, if it is written as “M causes M*,” it should be read as “an instantiation of M causes an instantiation M*.” In short, to save redundant expressions, I will say just as A property causes B property.

Coming back to diagram 1 to explain Kim's reductive physicalism, Kim's supervenient argument contains 3 key concepts: exclusion, closure, and over-determination. Supervenience simply means that a metaphysical property “depends on” and “is reducible to” its ground physical property. So, M supervenes its ground P, and M* supervenes its ground P*. Closure means that if there is a physical effect, there must be a physical cause. Over-determination is Kim's term to criticize non-reductive physicalism which says that not only physical property but mental property can also be a causal power. However, Kim argues that causal over-determination is not necessary to a physical effect. According to Kim, in the physical world, one physical cause is sufficient for a physical effect. So, Kim argues that M's

6 Kim, *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*, 45; 55; 63.

causation of P* must be excluded. In addition to that, although it seems as M causes M*, since M is reduced to P and M* is reduced to P*, the reality is that P causes P*. In the mean while, epiphenomenalists say that there is no such thing as mental property. Simply put, mind, free-will, consciousness, and so forth, are all epiphenomena. As it is mentioned above, Kim carefully keeps distance both from epiphenomenalism by distinguishing causal power from causal efficacy and from emergentism. Emergentism argues that mental property emerges somehow out of physical property and it has causal power. But Kim criticizes emergentists by asking ‘if mental properties do not supervene any physical properties where do they come from and how would you be so sure they would affect physical world?’⁷

2. Is John Wesley a Monist?

Intriguingly, two giant wesleyan theologians, Young-tae Han and William R. Cannon, show discrepancy on Wesley's view on mind-body problem. While Han summarizes Wesley as a monist, Cannon describes him as a dualist. There would be no discrepancy if Han and Cannon mean substance monism and property dualism, respectively, since those two are compatible with each other. However, Han seems to show somewhat ambiguous explanation for Wesley's view on mind-body problem.

⁷ For Kim's criticism on emergentism see, Jaegwon Kim, "Making Sense of Emergence," reprinted in Jaegwon Kim, *Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2010 [1999]), 8-40 and Jaegwon Kim, "Being Realistic about Emergence," in P. Clayton and P. Davies eds., *The Re-Emergence of Emergence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 189-202.

Although Wesley insists dichotomy he does not try to separate body and soul in human. Body and soul are too intimately related, so its unification is eternal union... As modern theologians insist holistic view on human as a whole rather than divided constituents, such holistic view on human is already found in Wesley.⁸

Han seems to describe Wesley both as a dualist and a monist. For him not to be self-contradictory, Han should have meant a "property" dualist for Wesley. However, one should note that a property can not exist alone without the substance which that property is clinging to. For Han to be consistent with Wesley's holism which he insists, he must have meant that the eternal unity of spirit, soul, and body, is the only substance.

However, if the intermediate state is to be concerned for Wesley's anthropology, Han would be devastated. In regard to "the intermediate state"⁹ of a Christian, indeed, Wesley says, the Holy Spirit, "in the state of separation, comforted the soul, but did not raise it above the intermediate region of Paradise."¹⁰ It is interesting that Wesley has not just the concept for the intermediate "state" but also for the intermediate "space," which is quite different from reformers such as John Calvin and Martin Luther who do not give

⁸ Young-tae Han, *Systematic Theology in John Wesley* (Seoul: Sung Kwang Publishing Co., 1993), 77.

⁹ The intermediate state is the state of Christians during the period between the physical death and the second coming of Jesus Christ. See, Daekyung Jun, "Arthur T. Pierson's Evangelical Eschatology," *Pierson Journal of Theology* 7(2) (2018), 71-94.

¹⁰ John Wesley, "On the Holy Spirit," in *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.* vol. 12. (London: John Mason, 1829), 514. (Sermon CXLI). (Hereafter, Wesley's *Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.* vol. 12. will be referred in an abbreviation form such as this: Wesley, *Works* 12, 514.)

any significant meaning on the intermediate "space" other than "state." Since the intermediate "space" is more than little off topic from the main theme of this paper, I am not going to deal with it here. But the thing is that Wesley signifies the separation of body and soul for a Christian in the intermediate state. As Han's claim, if the eternal unity is the only substance, would Wesley mean that there is no substance at all for all Christians in the intermediate state? It does not seem like it since "space" is a substance where a substance, which is soul, goes to. What does that mean? Wesley's view on the intermediate state of Christians can neither fit into substance monism nor into property dualism.

In the contemporary philosophy of mind, two most famous theories for monism would be epiphenomenalism and reductive physicalism. It seems that Wesley can neither fit into epiphenomenalism nor reductive physicalism. According to *SEP* (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*), "epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events."¹¹ However, Wesley says, "my soul has from Him an inward principle of motion, whereby it governs at pleasure every part of the body. It governs every motion of the body."¹² According to reductive physicalism, as we have seen above with Kim's supervenience argument, mental property can not exist without its ground physical property which it supervenes. However, Wesley says, "for when my body dies, I shall not die: I shall exist as really as I did before."¹³

11 "Epiphenomenalism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (May 11, 2019), accessed on May 14, 2022, available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/>.

12 Wesley, "What is Man?" in *Works* 12, 227. (sermon CIX, sec. 7-9).

13 Wesley, "What is Man?" in *Works* 12, 228. (sermon CIX, sec. 10).

Therefore, since Wesley can neither fit into epiphenomenalism and reductive physicalism, Wesley is far from substance monism. It could be concluded that Han's monism or holism for Wesley was a brand new idea that no philosophers of mind have ever thought of, or Han is too hasty to throw Wesley into the hole of monism that Han himself has not studied or pondered thoroughly.

III. John Wesley's Dualism: Non-reductive Physicalism or Emergentism

In the mean while, William R. Cannon seems to depict Wesley as a substance dualist. Cannon summarizes Wesley's conception of the nature of man briefly as follows:

What, we ask of Wesley, is the soul? He tells us that he cannot say that the soul is a material substance... But the point is that something besides the body directs the body... Thus Wesley reminds us that unquestionably man is something distinct from his body. When the body dies, he does not die; and this self-moving, thinking principle, with all its passions and affections, continues to exist after the body has decayed and "mouldered into dust."¹⁴

According to Cannon, Wesley can neither be regarded as an epiphenomenalist nor a reductive physicalist since he sees that the soul, which is immaterial, does not die even when the body dies

¹⁴ William Ragsdale Cannon, *The Theology of John Wesley: with Special Reference to the Doctrine of Justification* (Nashville, New York: Abingdon Press, 1946), 184f.

and the soul, distinct from the body, has causal power to the body. Therefore, Wesley can not be in any of monism categories in the taxonomy of contemporary philosophy of mind.

One more to be concerned is that if it would be too soon to conclude that Wesley as a substance dualist since one might see as if Cannon argues that Wesley's understanding of the soul as a property. Cannon says as follows:

Together with thought and will, we are conscious of **another distinct property of the soul**. That property is freedom the power of self-determination, which is capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul as well as all the movements of the body.¹⁵

Cannon's expression, "another distinct property of the soul," is somewhat ambiguous. So, does Cannon regard soul as a property of autonomy or as a substance which has a property of freedom of will? In other words, is Wesley, then, a substance dualist, or a property dualist? There are only two possible options to that question. 1) Cannon has misconception on mind-body problem and he does not and can not distinguish substance dualism from property dualism. 2) John Wesley is the reason for the ambiguity since he says as if soul is substance here and property there. Let's find out, then, if Wesley is a substance dualist or a property dualist.

As Kim points out, both non-reductive physicalists¹⁶ and

¹⁵ Cannon, *The Theology of John Wesley*, 185. Boldfaced emphasis is made by the writer

¹⁶ Generally, materialism and physicalism are interchangeable each other. However, I distinguish those two since there could be a physicalist supports for psychism against materialism. One good example is 2021 Nobel Prize in Physics Laureate,

emergentists are anti-reductionists and insist that there are downward causation from mental properties which are distinct from and can not be reduced to physical properties.¹⁷ In short, they argue that mind do has causal power. According to Ned Block, since Kim excludes the causal power of the upper (mental) level and reduces it to the bottom (physical) level, if this is generalized, the causal powers for everything in the world are being drained all the down to the bottom particle physics level. And that, if Kim's exclusion argument is right, all of the other special sciences other than particle physics such as chemistry, biology, geology, psychology and so forth, do not have any causal explanation for the things that they are dealing with in their own disciplines.¹⁸ Of course, Kim denies his supervenience argument to be generalized.¹⁹ The thing is that Kim, a reductive physicalist, denies but Block, a non-reductive physicalist, insists "downward causation" from mind to body.

Wesley seems to be a dualist since he argues the downward causation from soul to body as follows:

And they seem to be the only spring of action in that inward principle I call the soul. But what is my soul? ... "But the air moves."

Sir. Since it is not a theme closely related to the main argument of this paper, I would just use materialism and physicalism as if they are interchangeable in this paper.

17 Jaegwon Kim, "'Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Nonreductive Materialism," in Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim eds., *Emergence or Reduction?* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992).

18 Ned Block, "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67 (2003), 133-150.

19 See, Jaegwon Kim, "Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 97 (1997) and Jaegwon Kim, "The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended," in *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), chapter 2, 32-69.

It is moved by the ethereal fire, which is attached to every particle of it; and this fire itself is moved by the almighty Spirit, the source of all the motion in the universe. But **my soul** has from Him an inward principle of motion, whereby it **governs at pleasure every part of the body. It governs every motion of the body.**²⁰

It seems that Wesley could fit into a broad category of dualism. However, it would be too soon to conclude if Wesley is a property dualist or a substance dualist since both property dualists and substance dualists admit the downward causation.

Both substance dualists and property dualists argue the mind of a person does have causal power to the body. A non-reductive physicalist, who is a property dualist, should argue that there are mental properties which can not be reduced to physical properties. However, the thing that a non-reductive physicalist can not assert is that a mind(or a soul) would exist apart from its physical body. Non-reductive physicalists are also physicalists. They are just anti-reductivists. That is the significant difference between property dualism and substance dualism. As we know, Wesley says that soul lives forever, as it follows.

But what am I? Unquestionably I am something distinct from my body. It seems evident that my body is not necessarily included therein. For when my body dies, I shall not die: I shall exist as really as I did before... Indeed at present this body is so intimately connected with the soul, that I seem to consist of both. In my present state of existence, I undoubtedly consist both of soul and

²⁰ Wesley, "What is Man?" in *Works* 12, 227. (sermon CIX, sec. 7-9). Boldfaced emphases are made by the writer.

body: And so I shall again, after the resurrection, to all eternity.²¹

Keeping this in mind, let's come back to Cannon. We have seen above that Cannon sees Wesley as a substance dualist but he seems somewhat ambiguous if Wesley sees soul as a property or a substance. We needed to see if Cannon is being ambiguous by mingling substance with property or Wesley is the genuine reason for this. Let's hear what Wesley says about this.

I am conscious to myself of one more property, commonly called liberty. This is very frequently confounded with the will; but is of a very different nature. Neither is it a property of the will, but **a distinct property of the soul**; capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the motions of the body... I have not only what is termed, a "liberty of contradiction," – **a power to do or not to do**; but what is termed, a "liberty of contrariety," – **a power to act one way, or the contrary**.²²

By seeing this now we know that Wesley is the reason for the ambiguity. So, it would not be right to say that Cannon is misunderstood. If we look into the whole paragraph, as we try to understand what Wesley means in the textual context, we can find out that he did not say soul as a property but liberty of will as soul's property.

In a broader sense, emergentism can be regarded as a version of non-reductive physicalism, as epiphenomenalism can be regarded as a version of reductive physicalism. However, as we have seen

²¹ Wesley, "What is Man?" in *Works* 12, 228. (sermon CIX, sec. 10).

²² Wesley, "What is Man?" in *Works* 12, 228. (sermon CIX, sec. 11). Boldfaced emphases are made by the writer.

above, Kim, by understanding reductive physicalism in a narrower sense, denies his reductive physicalism to be regarded in the same category with epiphenomenalism. In the same way, emergentists, since they argue that mind can exist even after the physical death, would not agree with them being regarded in the broader non-reductive physicalism since there is no way that mind can exist after the physical death in physicalism even it is non-reductive physicalism. John Wesley may not be a property emergentist but he can be a substance emergentist according to William Hasker²³ and Ahmad Ebadi et al.,²⁴ since Wesley sees that soul lives even after the death of its physical body. However, Wesley has never mentioned anything about before-life, in his commentaries and sermons, if there is soul or where soul dwells before physical birth, etc. This fact seems to fit well into substance dualist emergentism such as Hasker's.²⁵ But it could be little too soon to conclude that Wesley is a substance emergentist. It is because there has to be one more thing to be concerned in mental properties or substances other than soul, namely spirit, for a Christian anthropology if not to be remained in just a secular anthropology, for mind-body problem.

IV. John Wesley's Christian Anthropology as Trialism:

23 William Hasker, "Emergentism," *Religious Studies* 18(4) (1982), 473-488.

24 Ahmad Ebadi et al., "From the Emergent Property of consciousness to the Emergence of the Immaterial Soul or Mind's Substance," *HTS Theological Studies* 77(4) (2021), 1-8.

25 For the criticism on this idea that emergent dualism is a solution to the parallel debate between substance dualism and physicalism, see, Glenn Andrew Peoples, "William Hasker at the Bridge of Death: Emergent Dualism and the Prospects of Survival," *Philosophia Christi* 10(2) (2008), 393-409.

Substance or Property

1. Logical Impossibility of being Monism, Dualism, and Trialism at the Same Time

So, does Wesley support monism, dualism, or trialism? Logically, there is no way that Wesley is in all of those three categories. Of course, there is one solution that Wesley can be thrown into the intersection of three sets. That is feasible, if and only if, spirit, soul, and body are all properties not substances. For me, however, it seems unreasonable to say that substance monism, substance dualism, and substance trialism are all true. Logically speaking, if substance monism is true, it means that body is the only substance and the rest - spirit and soul - are mere properties. So, if substance monism is true, both substance dualism and substance trialism can not be true. I do not think that I have to explain in detail for the other two cases: 1) if substance dualism is true, the rest two can not be true, 2) if substance trialism is true, then the other two can not be true. In short, substance monism, substance dualism, and substance trialism can not all be true at the same time. They have no intersection area. Even if they do, it is an empty set. There exists no interpretation or instantiation for that empty set intersection to have a truth value.

However, Han seems to describe Wesley as a traditional dualist for general human mind-body problem, as a trialist for Christian anthropology, and as a monist for catching up with modern or contemporary ethos.²⁶ To me, it sounds like a version of Sabellian

²⁶ For instance, see, Jeong Joon Kim, "Christian Spiritual Education: A Holistic Approach," *Madang* 29 (2018), 109-138.

modalism for Wesley on anthropology, by mingling monism, dualism, and trichotomy as if they are mere three modes, just like modalists see three persons of God of Trinity as three modes. What I mean is that Han's summary on Wesley's anthropology on mind-body problem is that much ambiguous and even weird. Of course, I understand what Han tries to do. Han would want his admirable Wesley to be in the tradition of Reformed, as well as in the ethos of contemporary theology, by denying Wesley as a trichotomist. Han says,

Wesley supports dichotomy of mind and soul for constituents of natural human, and naturally trichotomy is denied... Wesley's idea that human consists of body and soul is in consistent with the reformers' view... Body and soul are too intimately related, so its unification is eternal union... As modern theologians insist holistic view on human as a whole rather than divided constituents, such holistic view on human is already found in Wesley.²⁷

It seems that Han wants Wesley to be a person who can describe natural/general humans with dualism, and a person who can not give up the spirit constituent for Christians. Han says,

There is one intriguing idea in Wesley's view on the natural constituents of human. He argues that there is one more element, which is spirit, for Christians while all natural humans are explained with dichotomy... But it does not mean that Wesley insists trichotomy. It is because the spirit which Christians have is a supernatural element that is the Holy Spirit. Dichotomy or trichotomy are mere theories to explain natural constituents of

27 Han, *Systematic Theology in John Wesley*, 76f.

human.²⁸

And yet, it is little disappointing that Han is too hasty to conclude without any thorough examination and tries to throw Wesley at once into three incompatible categories: monism, dualism, and trialism. If I ask Han to pick only one among those three, he would pick monism as we have dealt already above since he says that in Wesley's anthropology spirit, soul, and body are in one eternal union after all whether he/she is a Christian or not.²⁹

2. Is Spirit mere a Property of Soul?

Han emphasizes that Wesley sees there are only two options for spirit, to be material or immaterial. If spirit is material, Wesley ought to be regarded as a trialist. But he said that if spirit is immaterial, then spirit is sticking with soul.³⁰ What does that mean? For the commentary on the I *Thessalonians* 5:23,³¹ Wesley says, indeed:

Spirit and soul and body: Only the last two are the natural constituent parts of man. The first is the supernatural gift of God, to be found in Christians only. That man cannot possibly consist of three parts appears hence: the soul is either matter or not

²⁸ Han, *Systematic Theology in John Wesley*, 76f.

²⁹ Young-tae Han, *Systematic Theology in John Wesley* (Seoul: Sung Kwang Publishing Co., 1993), 77.

³⁰ Han, *Systematic Theology in John Wesley*, 76.

³¹ In his commentary on the I *Thessalonians* 5:23, John Calvin sees a man has three constituent parts: body, soul, and spirit. According to Calvin, spirit is the part of a mistress for reason or intelligence, soul is the part for affections that occupy a middle place for commanding, and body is the part that renders obedience. John Calvin, *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians* (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1851), 277.

matter; there is no medium. But if it is matter, it is part of the body; if not matter, it coincides with the spirit.³²

Here, Wesley seems to describe spirit as a quality or property of soul. According to Wesley, it sounds as if a soul has spirit, the soul goes to heaven, if not, hell. It seems that presence or absence of spirit for soul is just like “spin,” either up(↑) or bottom(↓), is the fundamental character of atomic particles. And as if a neutron, which is electrically neutral, has one “up” quark(+2/3 electric charge) and two “down” quarks(-2/3 electric charge); a nucleus, which has +1 electric charge, has two “up” quarks(+4/3 electric charge) and one “down” quark(-1/3 electric charge), Wesley seems to see the presence of spirit as “up” state of soul, and the absence of spirit as “down”(or bottom) state of soul.

Can we see, then, spirit as a property of soul in the theology of Wesley, in the perspective of causal power as we have seen above in Jaegwon Kim's argument? As I mentioned, a property itself can not have a causal power, but an instantiation of a property can. If obtaining spirit is the mark of having the ticket to go to Heaven, then should spirit still be called a property, though? For Wesley, spirit seems to have a causal power for going to heaven. Then, it must have been crucially significant theme throughout the entire history of Christianity. In that sense, if spirit is mere a property of soul, would that be like a person being taller than 180cm to pass the gate to a club, or lighter than 50kg to go into a horse ride? If so, that property seems too light and weak, to say that it is crucial mark

³² John Wesley, *Wesley's Notes on the Bible*, G. Roger Schoenhals ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Francis Asbury Press, 1987), 551

to go to heaven. However, more serious problem is that spirit as a property sounds like it is an ordinal scale to indicate the degree or progress. But, for Wesley, spirit is more like a nominal scale, to indicate its presence or absence. In that case, it should be dealt, in an ontological sense, with the terms such as realism or anti-realism. The thing is that if spirit is whether reality of property or reality of substance. If “spirit” for heaven is just like the “ticket” for a soccer stadium, spirit seems to be a substance. It is not a property like being taller than 180cm to get into a place. It is rather a substance you have to hold for real to get through the gate of a place.

An allegory with constituents of a smart phone, it would get much clearer: hardware for body, software(s) for mind, and USIM for spirit. Getting connected with the Holy Spirit, if spirit is as USIM, plus being activated, then that is a substance. But if soul ought be USIM, what about the softwares? They are the mental properties and mind for Kim and his opponents. So, softwares ought to be soul for Wesley. Of course, Han could argue that USIM ought to be soul and its being connected with the phone service company is the spirit. It seems *prima facie* reasonable because it would explain Wesley's theological zombie, which I am going to explain soon, for those who have soul but not spirit. In that, although there is USIM in a smart phone if it is not being connected with the phone company, it would be like a dead phone. If it is true then, the fact of being activated is a property. Is spirit, apart from and attached to soul, a substance, or a property just like a color attached to a matter? Spirit can be seen as a property of soul if it is regarded as a capacity to get connected with the Holy Spirit. That capacity would be like I would

have to lift 100kg babel or my car would have to run 100km/h. However, if spirit itself is the thing that makes possible to have connection with the Holy Spirit, then it must be a substance. If USIM is soul and its being connected is spirit, what would the softwares be? Kim and his opponents' mental properties and mind and Wesley's soul are more intelligible with the softwares not USIM. Therefore, my interpretation of Wesley that he sees spirit as substance seems more reasonable than Han's.

3. Mind and Soul

One might wonder why, in this paper, mind and soul are treated as if they refer to the same property or substance just like in Frege's "Sinn und Bedeutung"(sense and reference), the morning star and the evening star refer to the same object, Venus. In the theology of Wesley, one distinct property of soul is "autonomy," which mind has as a mental property in Kim's physicalism. Therefore, mind and soul are interchangeable in the argument of this paper. Regardless of mind being property or substance, from Descartes through Jaegwon Kim to Wesley, soul and mind are topological synonym each other. Let's here again what Wesley says about this.

I am conscious to myself of one more property, commonly called liberty... Neither is it a property of the will, but a distinct property of the soul; capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the motions of the body.³³

33 Wesley, "What is Man?" in *Works* 12, 228. (sermon CIX, sec. 11).

According to Robinson, there is an interchangeability between mind and soul in Wesley. Robinson says,

Wesley himself often seemed to struggle with differentiating between soul and mind. The difference between mind and soul was often rather unclear for Wesley. But, to be fair to him and his context, and recalling Martin's and Barresi's work, during the eighteenth-century the distinction between mind and soul was hazy.³⁴

4. Mind and Mental Properties; Body and Physical Properties

Mind can be defined either as 1) (as property) all the sum of mental properties, or 2) (as substance) non-physical mental substance which has mental properties. In the same way, body can be defined either as 1) (as substance) physical substance which has physical properties, or 2) (as property) all the sum of physical properties.

As we have dealt above, in Wesley mind and soul are interchangeable and mind/soul is a substance. It is, however, somewhat ambiguous if body is a property or substance in Wesley. On the one hand, Wesley seems to presuppose body as a fundamental physical substance. On the other hand, Wesley seems to treat body as a property since it can not exist alone without the soul which maneuvers it. If the former is right, in addition to spirit as a substance, Wesley's anthropology for mind-body problem must be trialism. However, if the latter is right, as spirit is sticking to the soul and body is a property of the soul, Wesley's anthropology must be

³⁴ Kyle Brent Robinson, "Body and Soul of Enlightenment: John Wesley, Methodism, and the Age of Reason," (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 2018), 22.

monism. Of course, there is another option for dualism for the latter case that body as property and soul and spirit as substances. However, that kind of dualism is not just weird in theology but strange also in philosophy. In Kim's physicalism, there can not be metaphysical two different substances such as soul and spirit. For Kim, they are reduced to mind as mental properties. Therefore, whether to see body as property or substance would determine if Wesley's anthropology is trialism or monism. To clarify more, it is inevitable to examine what spirit is in the theology of Wesley.

Borrowing from David Chalmers' "philosophical zombie," in a thought experiment for calling someone who is exactly same as a normal person except the absence of "qualia," I would name it Wesley's "theological zombie" for calling a person who is exactly same as a Christian except the absence of "spirit." Actually, Wesley sees a man who is not born again is spiritually dead. Wesley says as follows:

While a man is in a mere natural state, before he is born of God, he has, in a spiritual sense, eyes and sees not... He has ears, but hears not... His other spiritual senses are all locked up: he is in the same condition as if he had them not. Hence he has no knowledge of God, no intercourse with him... He has no true knowledge of the things of God, either of spiritual or eternal things. Therefore, though he is a living man, he is a dead Christian. But, as soon as he is born of God, there is a total change in all these particulars.³⁵

³⁵ Wesley, "Sermon XXI on the New Birth," in *the Works of the Rev. John Wesley* vol. 5 (New York: J. & J. Harper, 1826), 200.

The thing is that if a man, spiritually dead, is once born of a woman, that man must be born of the Holy Spirit. By being born again a man who was dead spiritually becomes a Christian who has spirit is alive in the eyes of God. Let's hear more what Wesley says,

And, "in Adam all died," all human kind, all the children of men who were then in Adam's loins. The natural consequence of this is, that every one descended from him comes into the world spiritually dead, dead to God, wholly dead in sin: entirely void of the life of God, void of the image of God, of all that *righteousness and holiness*, wherein Adam was created. Instead of this, every man born into the world, now bears the image of the devil... This then is the foundation of the new-birth... Hence it is, that being "born in sin," we must be "born again." Hence every one that is born of a woman, must be born of the Spirit of God.³⁶

Therefore, alive or dead, life or death, everything or nothing, heaven or hell, would be discerned and discriminated by the fact of presence or absence of spirit in a person. Then, would that spirit still a property? To be more specific, in the theology of Wesley, what is the difference between a spirit being and a non-spirit being? Do you think that there is only property difference, or substance difference? I believe in the Holy Spirit and I believe in the presence and reality of the Holy Spirit. And I believe that spirit that is given as a gift by the Holy Spirit is also a reality, non-physically though. To me, the fact that Wesley must have seen spirit as a property sounds improbable though not impossible. Since spirit has causal power for a man to be alive spiritually and to lift up a soul to heaven,

³⁶ Wesley, "Sermon XXI on the New Birth," in *Works* 5, 199.

spirit's presence in a body for a soul would not be just a property difference. Therefore, in the light of Jaegwon Kim's reductive physicalism, especially thinking of causal power of soul and spirit to body in causal explanation, I conclude that trialism is the most legitimate position of Wesley's anthropology for mind-body problem.

V. Conclusion: Breaking off the Engagement

To sum up the arguments that we have dealt so far, Wesley's anthropology for mind-body problem, in the light of Jaegwon Kim, can be formulated as follows:

- 1) Body is a material substance yet it can not exist alone without the soul.
 - 2) Soul is an immaterial substance since it can exist alone without the body.
 - 3) A Christian has spirit, but a non-believer does not have spirit.
 - 4) Spiritually, Christians are alive and non-believers are dead.
- Therefore, Wesley's anthropology, in regard to mind-body problem, is dualism for non-believers, while, trialism for Christians.

So, it could be concluded that Christian anthropology of John Wesley, who was a pastor and theologian, is trialism.

There is one thing that I should let readers know that it is not my intention, in this paper, to say that Han or Cannon are completely wrong. Rather, I tried to suggest an interpretation for consistency on what seemed to have discrepancies among Wesleyan theologians for Wesley's anthropology. All I did was to defend Wesley and

Wesleyan theology, not to emphasize that both Han and Cannon were incorrect. However, it ought to be noticed that Han and Cannon, especially Han, were more than little hesitant to conclude as if Wesley would be seen as monist, dualist, and trialist at the same time. I acknowledge that Han and Cannon were stepping stones for me to clarify Wesley's anthropology for mind-body problem. One of the reasons I wrote this paper is that Han and Cannon's works for Wesley would not be stumbling stones for anybody who wishes to know what Wesley's anthropology for mind-body problem is. I wish mine would become a stepping stone for someone too, not a stumbling stone.

Although I can tell that this paper has some amount of contribution to the development in Wesleyan theology, I should confess that due to the limitations of space and being off-topic to the main theme of this paper I regret that I could not deal with enough depth especially with two topics: theological zombie and spiritual emergentism in regard to traducianism. For the following research, it is expected to clarify Wesley's concept of "theological zombie" and if John Wesley was a traducianist or a creationist for soul.³⁷ In short, the research questions would be as this: "did Wesley think that spirit and soul are inherited or created?" and "what Wesley does think about before-life, before the physical birth?" These themes would help us more to draw the picture of the reality of Wesley' anthropology, especially on mind-body problem.

³⁷ For Wesley's traducianism see, Kyle Brent Robinson, "Body and Soul of Enlightenment: John Wesley, Methodism, and the Age of Reason," (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 2018), 164; 169, especially footnote 292-3.

[References]

- Block, Ned. "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67 (2003), 133-150.
- Calvin, John. *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians*. Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1851.
- Cannon, William Ragsdale. *The Theology of John Wesley: with Special Reference to the Doctrine of Justification*. Nashville, New York: Abingdon Press, 1946.
- Ebadi, Ahmad. Et Al. "From the Emergent Property of consciousness to the Emergence of the Immaterial Soul or Mind's Substance." *HTS Theological Studies* 77(4) (2021), 1-8.
- Han, Young-tae. *Systematic Theology in John Wesley*. Seoul: Sung Kwang Publishing Co., 1993.
- Hasker, William. "Emergentism." *Religious Studies* 18(4) (1982), 473-488.
- Kim, Jaegwon. "'Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Nonreductive Materialism." In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim Eds. *Emergence or Reduction?* Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992.
- _____. "Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 97 (1997), 281-297.
- _____. *Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998.
- _____. "Making Sense of Emergence." Reprinted in Jaegwon Kim. *Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 [1999], 8-40.
- _____. *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- _____. "Being Realistic about Emergence" In P. Clayton and P.

- Davies Eds. *The Re-Emergence of Emergence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006: 189-202.
- Kim, Jeong Joon. "Christian Spiritual Education: A Holistic Approach." *Madang* 29 (2018), 109-138.
- Peoples, Glenn Andrew. "William Hasker at the Bridge of Death: Emergent Dualism and the Prospects of Survival." *Philosophia Christi* 10(2) (2008), 393-409.
- Jun, Daekyung. "Arthur T. Pierson's Evangelical Eschatology." *Pierson Journal of Theology* 7(2) (2018), 71-94.
- Robinson, Kyle Brent. "Body and Soul of Enlightenment: John Wesley, Methodism, and the Age of Reason." Ph.D. Diss., University of Rochester, 2018.
- Wesley, John. "Sermon XXI on the New Birth." In *the Works of the Rev. John Wesley* Vol. 5. New York: J. & J. Harper, 1826: 198-206.
- _____. "What is Man?" In *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.* Vol. 12. London: John Mason, 1829: 225-230.
- _____. "On the Holy Spirit." In *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.* Vol. 12. London: John Mason, 1829: 508-520.
- _____. *Wesley's Notes on the Bible*. G. Roger Schoenhals Ed. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Francis Asbury Press, 1987.
- "Epiphenomenalism." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (May 11, 2019). Accessed on May 14, 2022. Available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/>.

[초록]**김재권의 수반 논변의 빛에서 본 존 웨슬리의 인간론**

전대경

(한국외국어대학교, 객원강의교수, 과학철학)

존 웨슬리는 일원론자였을까, 아니면 이원론자였을까? 이러한 심신 문제와 관련하여, 웨슬리 신학계 내에는 뚜렷한, 소위 '수용된 견해'가 아직 보이지 않는다. 대표적인 예로, 저명한 웨슬리 신학자 윌리엄 랙스데일 캐논은 웨슬리를 실제 이원론자로 묘사하는 반면, 또 다른 저명한 웨슬리 신학자 한영태는 웨슬리를 실제 일원론자로 묘사한다. 둘 중 한 명이 옳을까, 아니면 둘 모두 틀렸을까? 논리적으로, 둘 모두 참일 수는 없다. 만일 존 웨슬리가 영, 혼, 육의 실체를 모두 인정하는 삼원론자였다면, 이는 캐논과 한영태 모두 틀렸음을 의미할 것이다. 심신 문제와 관련하여 존 웨슬리의 인간론은 실제로 무엇이였을까? 이 질문이 바로 본 소고의 바닥 전체에 깔려 있는 연구질문이다.

위의 질문에 대한 답변을 찾기 위해, 본 소고는 배제 논변이라고도 알려진 김재권의 수반 논변의 빛에서 웨슬리의 인간론을 다룬다. 환원적 물리주의자로 잘 알려진 김재권과 그에 대한 비판가들(비환원적 물리주의자들)의 논쟁은 우리로 하여금 심신 문제에 대한 웨슬리의 견해를 구체화하고 재조명하는 데에 유리한 지점으로 안내할 것이다. 심신 문제와 관련한 본 소고의 핵심 주제에 더 집중하기 위해 본 소고는 인간론과 관련한 다른 세부 주제들을 의도적으로 배제한다.

본 소고는 심신 문제에 대한 웨슬리의 인간론의 실재를 규명하고자 한다. 먼저, 일원론자로서 웨슬리가 환원적 물리주의자였는지, 아니면 부수현상론자였는지 여부를 다룬다. 그런 다음, 웨슬리가 속성 이원론자(혹은 비환원적 물리주의자)였는지 아니면 실제 이원론자였는지 여부를 다룬다. 마지막으로, 웨슬리가 삼원론자였을 경우를 상정하여 웨슬리의 심신 문제에

대한 인간론을 종합적으로 다룬다. 이를 통해, 만일 “신자의 중간 단계”가 고려되었을 경우, 웨슬리의 그리스도인에 대한 인간론은 이원론이나 일원론일 수 없음을 논증한다.

키워드: 일원론, 이원론, 삼원론, 환원적 물리주의, 수반, 인과력

